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The Middle Eastern Societies 





ABSTRACT. There is a general lack of citizen trust in governmental 
institutions in the Middle East, especially because of changing of 
governments and resulting turmoil. Sequential Mixed Methodology was 
used, in which data from the 2016 Arab Barometer were supplemented 
with qualitative insights from two professionals knowledgeable about the 
political climate in the Middle East and content analyses of relevant 
journalistic accounts. A comparison of North Africa (characterized by 
political turmoil) and the Levant (political stasis) countries in how 
government functionality (efficacy, stability, and corruption), as 
perceived by their citizens, differentially colored trust in governmental 
institutions was used to illustrate the citizen-government dynamics that 
resulted in citizens questioning the legitimacy of government authority. 
Predictions, based on Max Weber’s theory of Political Legitimacy and 
Gaetano Mosca’s Elite Theory, that, on balance, functional governments 
will garner more citizen’s trust in the Levant than in North Africa, while 
corruption will have a more corrosive effect were supported. A trust 
surplus occurred as a result of governmental functionality, balancing out 
the trust deficit created by government dysfunctionality. These findings 
contributed to existing theoretical and empirical literature on the 
contested relationship between citizens and their governments. 
Additional research on sectarian and ethnic conflicts and types of 
government (monarchy, authoritarian, democratic) in the region as they 






The Middle East is a hard region to define, primarily due to the wide range of countries, 
the many languages or dialects, cultures, and traditions, it encompasses. Even though 
the region has no standardized definition, it can generally be split into three groups. The 
first group is comprised of the Gulf countries (Gulf Cooperation Council) which include 
Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman and Qatar. The second group, referred to as the 
“Levant”, is comprised of, but not limited to, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, and Jordan. The 
third is the “North Africa” group which includes Egypt, Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia. 
The latter two is the focus in this research paper. 
  
The Gulf countries have enjoyed economic success in the last few decades and are 
considered powerful Middle Eastern countries on a global scale. But, over the last 
couple of decades, many countries in the North African and Levantine regions of the 
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Middle East have experienced turmoil as a result of multiple wars, including civil wars 
and revolutions. Others look more static, even if in their extreme class inequality. For 
example, among the Northern African countries, Egypt has gone through a revolution 
and a political coup. Even though Algeria and Morocco have not recently been through 
governmental turmoil, they are characterized by poverty and instability. In the Levant 
camp, Syria is currently fighting a civil war and dealing with a huge refugee crisis, 
Palestine is under military occupation of the Israeli army, and Jordan is in political stasis 
but characterized by class inequality. 
 
The Middle East is a region that is always featured in the news, often under the section 
involving war, disaster and terrorism. Yet there is very little coverage and research 
regarding the effects of the turmoil and dramatic change in governments and war on 
citizens’ lives. Such lacunae are especially acute in the United States whose foreign 
policy in the Middle East has greatly affected the political dynamics of its current 
landscape. Consequently, the level of trust Middle East citizens have in their 





There is much scholarly literature on the politico-historical events that have occurred 
over the last few decades in the Middle East, specifically in the Levant and North 
African regions. Another stream in the Middle East scholarship has been about the 
economics-citizen trust equation, and the relationship between corruption and trust. 
  
The New Arab Order and Political Trust 
  
The 2011 uprisings that occurred across the Middle East created a “New Arab Order.” 
But soon after, the hopes of new democratic reform to replace autocratic regimes 
vanished. The uprisings were a result of citizen frustration with their countries stagnant 
economy and lack of political freedom (Lynch 2018:120). In the end, regimes were 
either overthrown as the byproduct of popular uprisings, or remained standing, as a 
result of the failure of popular uprising, or did not experience any popular uprisings. In 
either event, a shift was created in which traditionally strong powers such as Egypt2 
have collapsed and are now “barely functional states” (Lynch 2018:116). On the other 
hand, Gulf countries, such as Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, for 
historical and unique global economic reasons, have been able to maintain a strong 
political and economic presence in both the Middle East and worldwide; these Gulf 
countries were not part of the Arab Barometer survey, and are not included in this 
research. 
  
On the world stage, the Middle East has become a playground for both Western major 
powers and other powers such as Russia, to achieve their own political and economic 
goals. Power in the Middle East operates through “influence peddling and proxy 
                                                        
2 Which were included in the 2016 Arab Barometer Survey, the source of survey data for this paper. 
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warfare” (Lynch 2018:116). As a result, there is great sense of insecurity among the 
citizenry of the Middle East; for example, citizens are unsure of the likelihood of another 
uprising or civil war. In this volatile political climate, academics, politicians and others 
have posed important questions about the impacts of failed states, unresolved crises of 
governance, unrest and the resulting turmoil on the political attitudes of citizens. 
 
For one, the protests that swept through the North African and Levantine regions of the 
Middle East changed “two key civic attitudes, trust and tolerance”, fundamental to well-
functioning democracies (Spierings 2017:4). Niels Spierings synchronized over 40 Arab 
Barometer and World Values Survey conducted in Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, 
Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine, Tunisia, and Yemen, from before and after the uprisings. 
Using macro-level analysis, Spiering associated a fall in political-institutional trust with 
the uprisings in countries that went through democratic reform or regime change. 
Politics became less trustworthy to citizens as a result of “misbehaving” politicians and 
unsuccessful social reform policies. 
 
North Africa and the Origins of the Arab Spring 
 
The North African region of the Middle East includes Morocco, Libya, Sudan, Egypt and 
Tunisia, and Algeria. Tunisia was the birthplace of the Arab Spring in 2011, when 
Mohammed Bouzaizi, a street vendor, set himself on fire as a form of protest. His action 
was a catalyst for the wider Arab Spring. Since then, democracy and reform have 
become the focal point of pride in a region that needed it (Bremmer 2019). Protesters 
demanded that the government tackle rising corruption, reduce income inequality, 
create jobs, and increase wages. However, Bremer claimed that even though a 
democratic regime replaced the former president, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, it has not 
been a successful transition. For example, almost ten years later, Tunisia ’s 
unemployment rate is 30%, GDP per capita is low, wages are stagnant, and there is 
heavy dependence on financial support from the International Monetary Fund. Amidst 
such economic chaos, almost 11,000 demonstrations took place in 2018. 
 
Like Tunisia, Egypt, also saw the fall of President Hosni Mubarak in 2011 and in 2012, 
Mohamed Morsi, who represented the Muslim Brotherhood, was elected president. 
However, the democratic period in Egypt only lasted till 2014, when a military coup, 
spearheaded by Abed Fattah el-Sisi, led to the return of an authoritarian regime. The 
military coup used disorder of the popular protest to assume power (Ketchley 2018). 
Currently, Abdel Fattah el- Sisi's push towards a presidential term extension, by 
changing the constitution, is indicative of the corruption and illegitimacy of his reign. 
  
Unlike Egypt and Tunisia, Morocco, the third country in the North African region, did not 
experience a change in government. However, in 2011, a new constitution was 
introduced that aimed to improve democracy and the rule of law (Al Jazeera and 
Agencies 2011). In addition, a stronger separation of powers within governmental 
branches was created, giving the prime minister and parliament more executive 
authority and ultimately reducing the authority of the King Mohammed VI. The 
referendum on constitutional reforms, held on July 1st 2011, was approved by 98.49% 
3
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of voters, legitimizing the authoritative governing system in Morocco (No Author[a], BBC 
News 2011). Yet, despite the reforms, and increased transparency, corruption remains 
a major problem within the country, and elected officials power to change policy is 
heavily constrained (No Author[b], Freedom House 2019). 
  
Algeria the fourth country in the North Africa region, suffered through a civil war during 
the 1990’s, which resulted in the death of 100,000 Algerians (Algiers, Economist 2012). 
On May 10 1992, a general election was held. However, the electoral change was not 
deemed as revolutionary, especially considering that the 1992 elections were hijacked 
by the army in order to stop the Islamic Salvation Front from winning (Algiers 2012). On 
January 12, 2011 26-year-old Mohamed Aouichia set himself on fire in Algeria. The next 
day, January 13, 2011, Mohsen Bouterfif also set himself on fire. The two suicides were 
followed by many others causing hundreds of protesters to take to the streets. In 
response, a National Coordination for Change and Democracy was created with the aim 
of seeking systemic change. However, these protests notwithstanding, Algeria remained 
unaffected by the Arab Spring, mostly because it was recovering from the civil war and 




The Levantine region of the Middle East, the second considered in this paper, includes 
Lebanon, Jordan, Palestine, Syria, Israel; the region is sometimes extended to include 
Cyprus and Turkey. This region has faced intractable sectarian and ethnocentric 
conflicts, including, but not limited to the Palestinian-Israeli crisis, the independence 
struggle of the Kurds, and the rise of ISIS. The Levant is a volatile region that is deeply 
affected by broader Middle Eastern conflicts. The geopolitical clash between the Iran-
led and Saudi-led camps, the ideological conflict among the Muslim Brotherhood 
groups, and other religious conflicts has led to the internal fragmentation of the Levant 
(Dalacoura 2018:32). Global actors, such as the United States and Russia, have also 
contributed to the prolonged instability and vulnerable state of the region. 
  
Lebanon, with its fairly longstanding constitutional system, was not affected by the Arab 
Spring, much like its Levantine neighbors (Di Peri 2014). Yet, Lebanon experienced its 
own “spring” in 2005, following the assassination of the former Prime Minister Rafiq Al 
Hariri. His death was a catalyst of political change, which ultimately led to the end of 
Syrian military occupation of Lebanon and the withdrawal of Syrian troops. Lebanon, 
typified by confessionalism3, faces continued conflict in its civil society primarily because 
of the power imbalance among the various religious, ethnic, and associated political 
communities. But, even though the opportunity to change its political structure of 
                                                        
3 Confessionalism is a consciational system of government that proportionally allocates political 
power among a country's communities according to their percentage of the population (Harb 
2006). Per consciationalist governing principles: there is a proportional (numerical 
representation) allocation of political posts among communities with a grand coalition between 
community leaders on common policies that serve all. But there is communal autonomy and 
freedom for each community to determine its own affairs (as in personal status laws and mutual 
veto power on any decisions deemed detrimental by any community. 
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consciationalism, presented itself during the Arab Spring, it was lost because of 
deepening sectarian divide and politics.  
  
The legitimacy of the rule of Jordan’s monarchy was based on its rentier system 
(Muasher 2018:114). A social contract, imposed from the top down, through public 
spending rather than political participation, secured support for governmental and elite 
rule. “In return for their patronage, states expected citizens to leave governing to a small 
elite, which, over time, became more and more isolated from the general population” 
(p.115). Unlike Lebanon and other Levantine countries, the instability in Jordan is more 
economic than political. For example, the 2011 protests in Jordan began as a fight 
against unemployment, inflation and corruption. A real constitutional monarchy and 
electoral reforms were demanded by the people. In response, economic reforms were 
introduced to address the holes in the social contract. But with no political changes, the 
economic reforms, of privatization of state-run industries and liberalizing trading 
systems, only ended up benefiting the elite as opposed to the general population. In the 
end, the economic reforms were associated with the self-enrichment of elites (p. 116-
18). In the last decade, Jordan’s patronage system has been threatened as a result of 
the declining financial support from oil-producing countries and the United States. While 
Jordan has taken steps to pacify the protestors, such as firing three prime ministers and 
reforming a third of the constitution after the 2011 protests, these measures have not 
led to more power sharing between the monarchy and the judicial and legislative 
branches of the government (Muasher 2018:121). In the long run, by buying the support 
of its elite class, the monarchical government is able to operate, even if inefficiently, and 
maintain is legitimacy. 
  
The Palestine, another Levantine country, has been strife with economic and political 
instability, primarily because of external political actors and internal strife. The 
Palestine-Israeli conflict can arguably be said to be one of the main reasons for regional 
distress in the Middle East. The establishment of the state of Israel in 1948 has been 
the source instability both in Palestine and in the broader Middle East. The West Bank 
is currently under military occupation; Gaza remains under military siege, and there 
have been numerous bombings in the last decade. Yet, there has been no political 
change, nor was the area directly affected by the Arab Spring in 2011. The Hamas 
government has been the de-facto governmental institution in Gaza since its election in 
2006, with Mohamoud Abbas as the president of the State of Palestine and Palestinian 
National Authority. However, instability and resulting dysfunctionality, both as a result of 
external forces, mainly Israel, and internal corruption, has become almost permanent. 
Elliott Abrams, an American Diplomat, stated that "corruption is an insidious destroyer, 
not only of Palestinian public finance but of faith in the entire political system” in his 
testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Middle 
East and South Asia (Elliot, CFR 2012).  
  
In short, starting in 2011, the Middle East region has seen an uneasy mix of great 
political turbulence and stasis. Even though the Levantine countries, such as Lebanon, 
Jordan and Palestine, are characterized by political stasis but without major upheavals, 
they were still affected by the neighboring uprisings and wider Middle Eastern instability. 
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On the other hand, Northern African countries, except for Algeria, have witnessed 
immense political turmoil. In either case, whether political stasis or turmoil, citizen trust 
in the political institutions in the region has been shaky at best. In fact, according to 
Global Corruption Barometer, despite half a decade since the Arab Spring, there is still 
“widespread public dissatisfaction with government efforts to curb public sector graft” 
(Pring 2016:5). Sixty-one percent of citizens in the region perceive corruption to have 
increased in the last year. 
 
Economic Vitality and Trust in Government 
   
Aside from political volatilities and the resulting shattered citizen trust, scholars have 
identified economic instability or lack of economic vitality as two other sources of citizen 
discontent and distrust. Two distinct dimensions of economic instability, material 
instability and perceptions of economic instability, have been noted for their eroding 
influences on citizen trust. 
  
Material Economic Instability and Trust Erosion  
  
Economic stability, which has been scarce in the Middle East, particularly since 2011, is 
an important element in the trust equation. Economic stability refers to stable, material 
conditions in which a country offers its citizens job opportunities, opportunities for civil 
and political involvement for its citizens, and flowing economic activity (Hashemi 
2017:87). And sustained economic stability is expected to lead to a higher standard of 
living for citizens. On the other hand, when there is economic instability in a country, the 
socially and economically marginalized, especially its youth, feel frustrated and 
powerless. Often, citizens hold the country’s government and/or its corporations 
responsible for their economic security. Under these unstable conditions, it is not 
surprising that youth participate in insurgency or political militant movements, further 
deepening regional instability (p. 83). 
  
Ironically, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region benefited from the wealth 
created by the increase in oil prices in the1970s. However, failure to create employment 
opportunities for the expanding labor force led to a deterioration in economic conditions. 
Non-oil economies in the region rely heavily on “aid, capital flows, and worker 
remittances” from the oil- producing Middle Eastern countries (Abed and Davoodi, IMF 
2013). “Political fragmentation, recurring conflicts, and authoritarian rule have hampered 
the development of democratic institutions and remain major obstacles to economic 
reform” (Abed and Davoodi, IMF 2013). High-tariff barriers, imbalanced exchange rate 
policies, limited advancement of human capital, and poor provision of basic public 
goods and services are few of the many factors that have contributed to material or 
objective lack of economic growth within the region (Abed and Davoodi, IMF 2013). 
  
The material or objective strength of the economy is widely accepted to be directly 
linked to citizen trust in institutions (Eccles 2015:17). Eccles referenced Nye’s (1997) 
research which showed that governments who were unable to reduce unemployment, 
increase economic growth and provide social services were unable to gain trust from 
6




citizens. Increased globalization has provided citizens with access to more information, 
allowing them to be more aware of their rights and demand more from their 
governments (Eccles 2015:19). Also, over the last few decades, “social modernization” 
has led to the transformation of the relationship between citizens of the state and its 
governmental body. The growing distrust and skepticism of younger, more educated 
citizens has led to a new style of politics in which, as quoted by Eccles, there is “… less 
deference to authority, more assertive styles of action, and higher expectations for the 
democratic process” (p. 18). For example, Algerians protested against President 
Abdelaziz Bouteflika’s decision to delay the April 18 presidential election despite 
announcing that he will not continue his presidency of 20 years for a 5th term. However, 
Bouteflika’s move to step down did not guarantee that the ruling elite, consisting of his 
brother, the army and several industrial bosses, would relinquish their power (Nossiter 
2019). Besides, while Algeria has natural gas reserves, the common citizens have seen 
very little economic gain, leaving the youth very concerned about the lack of job 
opportunities (Adamson and Charlton 2019).  
 
Amidst such economic stagnancy, access to information has allowed citizens to more 
accurately assess the income inequality in their country. If governments are responsible 
for providing regulations that ensure stability, it follows that citizen trust in the efficiency 
of governments will be measured through the type of policies and regulations 
implemented as opposed to simply the quantity (Siems and Schnyder 2014). In fact, 
these authors argued that since the Global Financial Crisis of 2008, there has been a 
worldwide call for more government intervention, “ordoliberalism”, to restart the market 
economy so that citizens’ benefits, and interests can be furthered. Citizen awareness of 
the unfair distribution of wealth within the country was commented on by an Executive 
Director who was interviewed for this research (Interviewee #1). There is a pronounced 
difference, she said, between the lifestyle of government officials and that of regular 
working-class citizens. The government officials and leaders are always of the upper 
class while citizens are of the lower or middle class, with notably fewer material 
possessions and wealth. Therefore, citizens are demanding fair processes from their 
governments. On balance, it is not surprising that over the last few decades, public trust 
in government has been declining worldwide, including in the Middle East. 
 
Perceptions of Government (In)Efficacy and Citizen Trust 
  
A second stream in the literature on governments’ responsibility for economic stability 
and trust is the public’s perceptions of government efficacy and of their wellbeing. 
According to Tom van der Meer and Armen Hakhverdian (2016), while trust is based on 
the merit of governmental bodies, it is not based on actual policy performance but on 
the “perceptions of performance, accountability, impartiality, corruption” (p. 82). Meer 
and Hakhverdian, in their study of 42 countries in Europe (51,255 respondents) also 
showed that difference in process (greater accountability and impartiality), as opposed 
to macro-economic outcomes, explained variations in political trust, measured by 
“satisfaction with democracy” and “confidence in national political institutions” (p. 98). 
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Other researchers who studied political trust have documented similar themes. 
According to Kong (2013), based on the archival data of 7,182 citizens in the Asia 
Barometer survey (2004), trust in government was contingent on government goodwill, 
namely their intentions and purposes and the extent to which the governmental systems 
operated in the best collective interest of the people. Institutional trust is also 
competence-based, which directly links to the performance and the system's ability to 
deal with problems. Trust in government is vital in order to have economic development 
and progressive public policy (p. 847). Kong found that the more goodwill and 
competence-based trust citizens had in their governments, the more satisfied they were 
(p.854). 
 
Corruption and Trust 
 
Corruption is an extremely negative version of government efficacy. According to the 
authors of the 2016 Arab Barometer (AlKhatib et al. 2018), financial and administrative 
corruption was the second (17.2%) most important challenge that citizens felt their 
country faced. Experts also posited that authoritarianism and corruption were two of the 
three most important challenges facing the region as per the “Arab Voices” survey 
conducted by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Forty-eight out of the 
one-hundred-and-three experts surveyed stated that corruption is among the most 
pressing issue. Corruption takes many forms in the Middle East, including the use of 
security and armed forces to quell uprisings, which helps maintain leaders in their 
positions, derails the fight against political, minority and gender inequality and allows for 
religious and minority oppression and prosecution (Aman 2017:172). Another 2016 
Carnegie report titled “Arab Fractures: Citizens, States, and Social Contracts” also 
underscored the fact that political and economic control is linked to cronyism and 
corruption in the Middle East (Cammack et al. 2016). This linkage, they posited, must 
be broken if sustainable private-sector economic growth is to emerge. 
 
Restoring of Trust 
  
Broken trust (interpersonal and political) can be both a cause and consequence of 
corruption. Researchers have shown that countries characterized by corruption are 
stuck in a circle, where corruption creates a climate of distrust which, in turn, generates 
and nurtures more corruption. Restoring trust can be difficult since distrust “fosters a 
tolerant or acquiescent attitude toward corruption and, by creating the expectation of 
corrupt behavior among others, feeds individual participation in corruption” (Morris and 
Klesner 2010:1260). The normalizing and tolerance of official wrongdoing creates the 
casual expectation of negative conduct. Corruption erodes regime legitimacy, noted 
Morris. According to 2016 Global Corruption Barometer of MENA, nearly one third of 
citizens paid a bribe in the last year, approximately 50 million people. One in 3 people 
paid a bribe to the courts, while 1 in 4 paid a bribe to the police. Despite this, citizens 
feared retaliation if they spoke out about corruption, and 2 in 5 who did report corruption 
suffered retaliation. The unfair distribution of services through bribery, which 
undermines law and order, creates a negative environment that does not incite change. 
Morris went on to argue that the mutual causality between distrust and corruption make 
8




it difficult to fight corruption; since distrust undermines citizen’s belief in governmental 
promises to fight corruption and undermines governmental effort to mobilize society to 
fight corruption. As a result, citizens tend to be cynical about politics therefore tend not 
to participate in the political process as they believe that their actions will not have an 
effect. As he Professor who was interviewed by the author (Interview #2) noted, feeling 
of helplessness and the lack of empowerment to fight against government corruption 
leads to not only lack of trust, but unwillingness to change the status quo. 
 
No doubt, it is worthwhile, despite the declining levels of citizen trust, for societies and 
their citizens, to ask how the broken trust can be restored. Chris Eccles (2015), in a 
2005 survey of Canadian Citizens, documented that, in, despite the trend of declining 
trust in governmental institutions, trust can be restored when public organizations 
provide good leadership and management (50–65% impact), equal and ethical 
treatment (10–15% impact), quality services (10–20% impact) and services that meet 
citizens’ and community needs (10–25% impact). In other words, the more citizens 
believed that governmental institutions benefit them, the more trust they had in the 
institutions. 
  
Suggestions for Future Research 
  
Economic Vitality (or lack thereof) and corruption have had tremendous negative 
impacts on citizen trust in the Middle East. The Arab Spring of 2011 dramatically 
changed the political landscape of many countries. While some countries, such as 
Libya, Sudan, Iran and Yemen, were not surveyed in the Arab Barometer, general 
political trends can be found within countries in North Africa versus the Levant regions. 
Many countries in North Africa experienced a change in regime type while in others 
governmental systems remained the same. Further research is needed in order to 
understand why certain governmental types, such as monarchies, despite corruption, 
were able to retain power and legitimacy using top-down social contracts and access to 
natural resources, while other governments and leaders were overthrown. Additionally, 
ethno-sectarian tensions exist within many countries, and across border lines in the 
region. For example, there has been an on-going religious Sunni and Shiite power 
struggle which has divided the populations, challenged political boundaries, and fueled 
terrorism and civil war. The polarization of identity groups has gravely affected stability 
in the region. These factors need to be examined to assess the extent of which internal 
conflict has affected citizen trust in governmental institutions and affected their 
perceptions of their government’s ability to ensure the country’s stability and the 





In this research, an attempt was made to compare the level of trust that citizens in North 
Africa and the Levant region had in their governments’ functionality. Three dimensions 
of functionality were measured: perceptions of citizen’s stability, government efficacy, 
and corruption. Stability was indicated by feelings of personal safety and economic 
9
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stability. Perceptions of government efficacy covered areas of economy, employment, 
security and health. The third factor was corruption, based on perceptions of level 
corruption, government efforts to combat it, and cronyism. The following question was 
posed: “How does government functionality, as perceived by their citizens, differentially 
affect their trust in institutions in North Africa and Levant?” The control variables used in 
this research was level of education and gender to neutralize their potential confounding 





In order to theoretically explain why and how perceptions of government efficacy and 
stability, in particular personal economic stability and safety, as well as corruption affect 
the level of trust citizens have in their governments in the both North Africa and the 
Levant, political legitimacy and elite theory will be used. This analysis was theoretically 
framed using a synthesis of conceptual ideas offered by Weber (1964) and Dahl’s 
(1971) political legitimacy and Gaetano Mosca’s elite theories (1965). 
  
 
Elite Political Legitimacy and Related Hypotheses 
  
Political legitimacy refers to the right and acceptance of an authority, thereby giving the 
authority figure, or institutions as the case might be, the right to exercise power. The 
legitimacy of rulers or governments is derived from the population’s belief that the 
governing power appropriately uses the country’s laws and the constitution. To quote 
Max Weber “the basis of every system of authority, and correspondingly of every kind of 
willingness to obey, is a belief, a belief by virtue of which persons exercising authority 
are lent prestige” (Weber, 1964:382). Robert A. Dahl expanded on Weber and 
compared legitimacy to a reservoir, where as long as the water is at a specific level, 
political stability is maintained, while if it drops below the specific level, political 
legitimacy is endangered (1971:124-88). Therefore, functional institutions, including 
perceptions of government efficacy and stability, will legitimize their authority and 
cultivate a trust surplus among its citizens. 
 
Gaetano Mosca in his elite theory outlined in his “The Ruling Class” (Meisel 1965), 
added more detailed nuances to the political legitimacy of elites. It is a given that 
political legitimacy is needed for governing and that there is always those who are rulers 
and those who are ruled. But, “the first class, always the less numerous” performs all 
political functions, monopolizes power and favour the benefits that accompany such 
power. On the other hand, the masses are directed and controlled by the ruling class, 
“in a manner that is now more or less legal” (p. 50). But, Mosca argued that power is not 
exclusively justified by the de facto possession of it, but states that those in power find a 
moral and legal basis for it, further legitimizing and deeming it a “necessary 
consequence of doctrines and beliefs” that are already recognized and accepted in 
societies (p. 71). However, the isolation of lower classes, and their lack of accessibility 
to the ruling class can lead to political upheaval (107). The consequent pressure arising 
10




from the discontent of the masses, who are swayed by their passions, can influence the 
policies of the ruling class (p. 51). In other words, those who rule must garner the 
support of the masses in order to maintain their power (p. 51). Such support is gained 
through the consideration of the majorities’ beliefs and sentiments. Besides, in order for 
the minority to remain in power, they must be organized and efficient so that they can 
overcome the unorganized majority. Following Mosca’s elite political legitimacy 
arguments, it can be argued that when governments are seen to be functional, they will 
garner more citizen’s trust than otherwise. However, corruption can create a trust deficit, 
by corroding the trust that governments have garnered through their efficient provision 
of providing functional services to their citizens. 
  
Applying these theoretical arguments to the citizen-elite dynamics in the Levant and 
North Africa, elites in the Levant could be expected to garner more citizen trust than the 
North African elite because Levantine elites have maintained political stasis or stability, 
even if not economic progress. On the other hand, North African countries are not only 
ridden with economic equalities but also have been in political turmoil, and have 
experienced regime change which despite the hopes of many, did not bring about the 
expected economic and social change. Against this background, the first hypothesis 
tested in this study was: Functional governments will garner more citizen’s trust in the 
Levant than in North Africa, net of corruption, level of education and gender” 
(Hypothesis #1). 
  
However, when citizens perceive corruption in their government their trust will be 
shaken, creating a trust deficit. And given the volatile political histories of the North 
African region (because of the numerous changes in types of governments or rulers), 
the trust deficit caused by corruption is expected to be higher in North Africa than in the 
Levant. The Levant, on the contrary, has been characterized by political stasis, with 
stagnant governments and rulers, despite persistent economic inequality. Countries in 
North Africa, on the other hand, have experienced leader and government changes as a 
result of the Arab Spring yet also are burdened with economic and political turmoil. 
Therefore, we can hypothesize that corruption will have a more corrosive effect on 
citizen trust in North Africa than in the Levant. The many changes in the government 
elite in North Africa and to the extent there continues to dysfunction in each new 





Sequential mixed methodology was used, where statistical analyses of survey data 
were followed up with narrative accounting by journalists and other professionals to 
further interpret the statistical findings. Secondary survey data from the Middle East 
were used to measure and test the hypotheses about levels of trust in governmental 
institutions in the North African and the Levantine regions of the Middle East. Two 
narrative assessments provided by an Executive Director of an NGO in Lebanon and an 
international studies professor at an academic institution were supplemented with 
journalistic commentaries on the Middle East. 
11
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Secondary Data source 
  
The “Arab Barometer: Public Opinion Survey Conducted in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, 
Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine, and Tunisia, 2016” was a public survey conducted to 
assess citizen attitudes about public affairs, governance, and social policy in their 
countries of residence in the Middle East. Questions about the political, social, religious, 
and cultural life of respondents were posed throughout the survey. In addition to some 
general questions, respondents were asked to evaluate their political institutions and 
political attitudes, elections and parliament, the media, democracy, social, religious and 
cultural topics, the Arab world and international relations, and current affairs. The Arab 
Barometer is vital to understanding key issues in the lives of ordinary citizens in Arab 
society so that governmental and nongovernmental bodies can use the information to 
base their solutions to the specific problems faced within specific countries and the 
region as a whole. 
  
“Arab Barometer: Public Opinion Survey Conducted in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, 
Morocco, Palestine, and Tunisia, 2016” was carried out by eleven principal investigators 
(AlKhatib et al. 2018). Interviews were conducted in Arabic in the respondent’s place of 
residence to ensure a higher response rate and more truthful answers. The sample was 
drawn with the use stratified multi-stage sampling to cover a nationally representative of 
non- institutionalized adults aged 18 and above. In most countries the sample size was 
1,200 citizens. Furthermore, 300 Syrian nationals living in Jordan and Lebanon were 
interviewed. As shown in Appendix A, 49.9 % of the of the respondents were female 
and 50.1% were male in all countries except Egypt and Palestine. In Jordan, Lebanon 
and Tunisia 30.9% of the respondents had completed a secondary level of education 




Several journalistic accounts in newspaper outlets, that offer commentary on current 
and past news in the Middle East, were used to ascertain on-the-ground perspectives 
on government functioning and citizen responses. The newspaper outlets included “The 
Economist,” “The New York Times” and “Al Jazeera.”  In addition, two interviews were 
conducted with professionals who have deep knowledge about the functioning (or 
dysfunctions) of governmental institutions in North Africa and the Levant. The first 
interviewee (Interviewee #1, Professor) is an international studies professor at a 
university. Her specific focus is the Middle East. The second interviewee was an 
Executive Director (Interviewee #2) at an NGO in Lebanon, and has worked directly with 
the ministry of education to make education accessible to all children. She has 
volunteered for the NGO for 10 years, and has been the executive director for three 
years. 











Three types of statistical analyses, disaggregated by North Africa and Levant, were 
used in order to explore the validity of the hypotheses. Univariate analysis was, first, 
used to describe the sample using trust in institutions, perceptions of government 
efficacy, stability and corruption. Second, to explore the primary empirical relationship of 
level of trust in governmental institution with perceptions of government efficacy, 
stability, and corruption, bivariate correlations were used. Finally, multivariate analysis 
was used to assess the net impact of perceptions of government efficacy, stability and 
corruption on trust in governmental institutions. Illustrative examples of trust surplus and 
deficits in North Africa and the Levant were drawn from the narrative commentaries 
offered by journalists and professionals. 
 
Operationalization and Descriptive Analysis 
  
Overall, there was a low level of trust in governmental institutions in both regions. And 
as might be expected in low citizen trust environments, the governments in both regions 
were also judged to be less functional in their efficacy, their ability in maintaining 
stability and had high corruption ratings. However, there were notable differences in the 
two regions on trust as well as the functionality and dysfunctionality of their 
governments. North Africans perceived their governmental institutions to be more 
efficacious, stable, and less corrupt than their Levantine counterparts. More specifically, 
citizens in North Africa rated their governments to be more efficient in operating three of 
the four sectors considered; the economy, employment and security sector. It was only 
the health sector that Levantine nation citizens found to be more efficacious than the 
North Africans. An interesting note: even though citizens in the Levant believed that 
there was more corruption and cronyism in their respective countries than their 
counterparts in North Africa, the latter (North Africans) believed there was less 
crackdown on corruption and bribes. 
 
Trust in Institutions 
  
Given the recent turmoil in the Middle East, the low trust in institutions in both regions 
was to be expected. According to the Professor (Interviewee #2), economic hardship, 
instability, lack of accountability and high level of corruption amongst government 
institutions are the main factors that create trust deficits. The Executive Director 
(Interviewee #1) added, in order for there to be a surplus of trust, there must be a high 
level of ethics, transparency and accountability. However, for historical reasons 
discussed at the start of this paper, citizens of North African nations trusted their 
institutions a bit more than the Levantine citizens. The lower level of Levantine trust was 
captured in the Trust index mean (𝑥) of 9.01 on a scale of 6-14, in contrast to the mean 
(𝑥) of 10.16 in North Africa. 
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Table 1.A. Trust in Institutions  
Arab Barometer: Public Opinion Survey Conducted in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, 
Palestine, and Tunisia, 2016 
Concept Dimensions Indicators Responses Statistics  















1. No trust at all 
2. Not very much trust 
3. Quite a lot of trust 



















1. No trust at all 
2. Not very much trust 
3. Quite a lot of trust 









  Executive 
Branch 
Q2013. Trust 





1. No trust at all 
2. Not very much trust 
3. Quite a lot of trust 









 Army Q2016. Trust 




1. No trust at all 
2. Not very much trust 
3. Quite a lot of trust 




















1 Index of Trust in Government: ReversedQ2011 + ReversedQ2012 + ReversedQ2013 + ReversedQ2016; 




Some examples of the specific points of regional divergence in trust and mistrust are 
worth noting. Citizens of both regions registered “a great deal of trust” in armed forces; 
64.8% citizens in North Africa even if only 53.6% of Levant citizens. But there was more 
distrust than trust in all the other sectors considered here, particularly in the Levant 
nations. For example, in the Levant, 41.7% had “no trust at all” in the councils of 
ministers as opposed to only 27.8% in North Africa. Citizens in the Levant also 
distrusting of their courts and legal system; 32.9% of the citizens stated they had “no 
trust at all” compared to the 23.9% in North Africa. A similar pattern of low Levantine 
institutional trust (55.1% “no trust at all”) continued to the level of council of 




Trust in governmental institutions was hypothesized to be a product of the 
government’s functionality and dysfunctionality as evaluated by their citizens. 
14




Governments were considered to be functional based on how efficacious they were 
perceived to be and how stable the citizens felt their lives were. On the other hand, 
corruption was used to identify dysfunction within governmental institutions. According 
to the Professor (Interviewee #2) there are negative perceptions of government 
efficacy. Limited efficacy is a result of the lack of accountability leaders and 
governmental institutions. In a sense, they are above the law. Whether leaders and 
governmental institutions carry out their responsibilities efficiently or not, they will 
almost never be punished or voted out of office. 
 
Perceptions of Government Efficacy. Perceptions of Government Efficacy was 
measured by how effective the citizens thought their governments were in managing 
their respective countries. Citizen’s evaluated the performance of their own 
government’s ability to effectively grow the economy, creating employment 
opportunities, providing security, and offering health services. As illustrated in Table 
1.B governments were perceived to be less efficacious, than not, in both regions; the 
mean (𝑥) efficacious index score in North Africa was only 10.7 (on a scale from 5-20) 
and 10.2 (𝑥) in the Levant region. With the exception of providing security, both sets of 
governments were rated negatively (bad or very bad) than positively, and more so in 
the Levant. It is only in providing health services that the Levant governments were 
rated to be more effective than the North African governments. 
 
The case of Lebanon is illustrative. In Lebanon, 34.5% of citizens believed that 
government was not effective at managing the economy. Even though “Banque du 
Libyan,” the government run central bank in Lebanon, has strived to preserve the two-
decade old currency peg, the economy remained stagnant. The high interest rates have 
increased the risk within the financial system and is “strangling an already depressed 
economy” (Barrington 2018). Lebanon is currently the world’s third most indebted state 
but needs urgent fiscal reform to help the economy. According to Barrington, regular 
citizens are feeling the effects of the weak economy as annual growth rates has 
decreased to 1-2%, lending is down, business activity is falling, and prices are falling in 
the real estate sector, the pillar of the Lebanese economy.  
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Table 1.B. Perception of Government Efficacy  
Arab Barometer: Public Opinion Survey Conducted in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, 
Palestine, and Tunisia, 2016 
Concept Dimensions Indicators Responses Statistics  










Economy How would you evaluate: 
Q2041. The current 
government's 
performance on managing 
the economy? 
1.   Very Bad 
2.   Bad 
3.   Good 









  3.0 
   Q2043. The current 
government's 
performance on narrowing 
the gap between rich and 
poor? 
1.  Very Bad 
2.  Bad 
3.  Good 









    Q2042. The current 
government's 
performance on creating 
employment 
opportunities? 
1.   Very Bad 
2.   Bad 
3.   Good 










  Security Q20421. The current 
government's 
performance on providing 
security in the country? 
1.   Very Bad 
2.   Bad 
3.   Good 










  Health Q2044. The current 
government's 
performance on improving 
basic health services? 
1.   Very Bad 
2.   Bad 
3.   Good 










  Index of Perceptions of 










1 Index of Perceptions of Government Efficacy: ReversedQ2041 + ReversedQ2042 + ReversedQ20421 +  
  ReversedQ2011 + ReversedQ2043; correlations among the indicators for North Africa ranged from 0.49** to  





Stability. Governments in both regions fared a bit better (but not by much) in offering 
their citizens stability (Table 1.C). But, as with trust and efficacy, North African citizens 
felt more stable in their lives; on a summative index scale that ranged from 6-25, the 
North African mean (𝑥) was 14.83 compared to 13.93 in the Levant. Citizen’s based 
their perceptions about their stability on country’s economic stability and their personal 
safety. For example, in North Africa 59.3% believed that their household economic 
situation was “good” in comparison to only 48.9% of citizens in the Levant. Additionally, 
52.4% of citizens in North Africa reported that the future of their own personal as well as 
their family’s safety was ensured; only 35.3% of citizens in the Levant felt the same. 
Additionally, citizens in the Levant were more concerned with a terrorist attack (13.3%) 
16




or of being harassed in the street (25.9%) than North African citizens (4.3% and 7.3% 
respectively). In short, even in relatively unstable circumstances, North Africans felt that 
there was more (than the Levantines) economic stability in their country and 
experienced a higher degree of personal safety. 
 
Table 1.C. Stability  
Arab Barometer: Public Opinion Survey Conducted in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, 
Palestine, and Tunisia, 2016 
Concept Dimensions Indicators Responses Statistics  






How would you 
evaluate: 
Q101. The current 
economic situation 
in your country? 
1. Very Bad 
2. Bad 
3. Good 









    Q101a. The 
economic situation 
in your country five 
years ago (before 
the Arab uprisings) 
compared to the 
current situation? 
1. Much worse 
2. Somewhat Worse 
3. Almost the same 
as the current 
situation 
4. Somewhat better 















    Q102b. Your current 
household 
economic situation? 
5. Very Bad 
6. Bad 
7. Good 









  Personal 
Safety 
Q105. Do you 
currently feel that 
your own personal 
as well as your 
family's safety and 
security are ensured 
or not? 
1. Absolutely not 
ensured 
2. Not ensured 
3. Ensured 












  To what degree are 
you worried about: 
Q1072. A terrorist 
attack in your 
country. 
1. Very much 
2. Much 
3. Not much 










  Q1074. Being 
harassed or 
threatened on the 
street. 
1. Very much 
2. Much 
3. Not much 


















1 Index of Stability: ReversedQ101 + ReversedQ101A + ReversedQ102B + ReversedQ105 + Q1072 + Q1074;  
  correlations among the indicators for North Africa ranged from -0.02*** to 0.60***; Levant -0.01*** to 0.55*** 
*** p<=.001. 
 
While stability is crucial to citizens of the Middle East, democracy is not necessarily 
perceived to be the solution (Interviewee #2). According to the Professor, in a state of 
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instability and lack of personal safety, democracy and civil rights are considered a 
luxury. As a result, citizens are willing to settle for an ineffective government if its leader 
is able to guarantee, verbally at least, safety and economic security. In the Middle East, 
history has shown that citizens have a preference for tough leaders over democratic 




Government Corruption as Dysfunction 
  
In addition to assess the functionality of governments, citizens were asked to evaluate 
the extent of corruption in their countries. Specifically, their perception of corruption 
within state agencies, cronyism in employment, and the extent to which corruption was 
being remedied was addressed. As shown in Table 1.D, both regions were marked by 
high levels of corruption, but corruption was more rampant in the Levant; the mean (𝑥) 
corruption index score was 10.09 (range of 4-12) in the Levant and 9.61 in North Africa. 
Two examples to illustrate regional differences in corruption levels. One, there was a 
notable difference in the level of cronyism; while 75.3% citizens in the Levant believed 
that obtaining employment through connections is “extremely widespread,” only 61.5% 
of citizens in North Africa thought so. Second, more than half (57.2%) of Levant citizens 
believed that there was corruption in their state agencies to a “large extent” in 
comparison to the 55.2% of North Africans. But, Levantine governments (35%) were 
more likely to be seen as cracking down on corruption than the 25.2% of North Africans. 
That is, even though corruption was more rampant in the Levant than in North Africa, 
the former governments were doing more to combat corruption. 
 
Once again, according to the Professor (Interviewee #2), high levels of corruption stem 
from the ability of politicians, with the use of the country’s resources and the 
international support, to push certain agendas and create divisions within the country. 
Many citizens see governmental institutions as compromised or corrupted, and too tied 
up in politics. For example, the people that are chosen to take high positions within 
governmental institutions are based on political ties, as opposed to merit (Interviewee 
#1). Adeel Malik, a professor at Oxford University, mentioned in Kassab’s article “The 
cost of cronyism under Mubarak,” found significant cronyism between the late 1990’s 
and 2001 in 385 companies in Egypt that had been associated the former president, 
Hosni Mubarak. Similarly, 497 companies in Lebanon and 662 in Tunisia had strong ties 
to the political regimes in place, while 370 in Morocco were owned by holding 
companies indirectly controlled by the King (Kassab 2019). Besides, Kassab noted that 
companies in Egypt that were politically associated with the regime received more 
benefits. For example, they received 92% of the total loans granted to the private 
sector, despite not having higher profitability compared to non-politically connected 
firms.  
 
Corruption, as shown in Table 1.D., had a more corrosive effect on citizen trust, creating 
more trust deficit, in Levant than in North Africa. The empirical data from The Global 
Corruption Barometer are illustrative. According to the Barometer 92% of citizens in 
18




Lebanon, 75% of Jordanian citizens and 70% of Palestinian citizens believe corruption 
had increased. On the other hand, citizens in North Africa did not believe corruption had 
increased as drastically as in the Levant. While 64% of citizens in Tunisia and 51% of 
Algerians thought that corruption had increased, this was a stark contrast to the 28% of 
Egyptians and 26%of Moroccans who held the similar belief. 
 
Table 1.D. Corruption  
Arab Barometer: Public Opinion Survey Conducted in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, 
Palestine, and Tunisia, 2016 
Concept Dimensions Indicators Responses Statistics  




Corruption Perceptions To what extent do 
you think that: 
Q210. There is 
corruption within 
the state agencies 
and institutions in 
your country? 
1. Not at all 
2. To a small extent 
3. To a medium 
extent 














corruption and root 
out brides? 
1. Not at all 
2. To a small extent 
3. To a medium 
extent 










  Q213. How to get 
a job1.  
1. I do not know of 
any relevant 
experiences  
















































1 Some people say that nowadays it is impossible to get a job without connections (wasta) while others say that  
  jobs are only available to qualified candidates. Based on a recent experience (or experiences) you are    
  personally aware of, do you think that…? 
2 Index of Corruption: ReversedQ210 + ReversedQ211 + ReversedQ213; correlations among the indicators for 
  North Africa ranged from 0.36*** to- 0.20***; Levant 0.40*** to 0.20*** 
*** p<=.001 
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A preliminary exploration of the connections of citizen trust with government efficacy, 
stability, and corruption were conducted using bivariate correlations (Table 2 in 
Appendix A). In North Africa, the more efficacious the government was perceived to be, 
and the more stable their personal life was, the more likely they were to trust 
governmental institutions (Efficacy r=0.47***, Stability r=0.31***). On the other hand, 
perceived corruption reduced trust in North African societies (r= -0.47***). Similar 
patterns were evident in the Levant region. For example, the more efficacious (r=0.59***) 
and the more stable their lives were (r=0.36***), the more trusting they were of their 
governments, but corruption led to less trust (r= -0.48***). As illustrated in Table 2, the 
level of trust in institutions was more reflective of government efficacy, stability and 
corruption in the Levant than in North Africa. Also, in both regions, the more educated 
citizens were, the less trust they had, particularly in North Africa (North Africa r= -0.15***, 
Levant r= -0.08**). Some gender differences were also evident, with men being more 
trusting than women (North Africa r= -0.06***, Levant r= -0.05**).  
  
 
Linear Regression Analysis 
  
In order to test the robustness of the hypothesized regionalized connections of citizen 
trust with functional-dysfunctional assessments of their governments and consequent 
trust deficits, two linear regressions were run, one each for the two regions. The 
functionality of governments was indicated by perceptions of government efficacy and 
stability, while corruption levels represented dysfunctionality in governmental institutions 
(Table 3). 
 
In North Africa, on balance, perceptions of government efficacy were the main reason 
for increased levels of trust (β= 0.25***). While citizen trust in their governments was 
reduced by the corrosive negative effects of corruption (β=-0.29***), governments were 
able to combat the negative consequences of corruption, with functional services and 
stability. There was a parallel functionality-corruption-trust dynamic in the Levant. That 
is, functional Levantine governments engendered much more citizen trust (β=0.41***) 
than the negative trust consequences of governmental corruption (β=-0.23***). 
 
Two additional trust connections, even if not as prominent as that of efficacy and 
corruption, were noted. Economic and personal stability contributed some to cultivating 
more trust in governments in both regions, even if more so in Northern Africa; Stability β 
in North Africa = 0.10***and 0.07*** the Levant. And educated North African citizens were 
less trusting of their governments (β = -0.12**than their Levantine counterparts (β = -
0.04**). 
  
Another look at the regional differences in the functionality-corruption balance in 
engendering citizen trust revealed interesting lessons in trust surplus and deficits. In the 
Levant, governments were able to cultivate a trust surplus; that is, the trust deficit 
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caused by corruption (β=-0.23***) was more than compensated for by functional 
governments (Efficacy β=0.41***and stability β=0.07**combined). While in North Africa, 
citizen trust that efficacious governments and stability were able to garner (Efficacy 
β=0.25***and stability β=0.10) were just about sufficient to make up for the corrosive 
effects of corruption (β=-0.29***). In other words, the trust surplus created in the North 
African region was significantly smaller than the trust surplus in the Levantine region. 
 
Table 3. Regression Analysis of Trust in Government  
Arab Barometer: Public Opinion Survey Conducted in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, 
Palestine, and Tunisia, 2016; Beta (β) Coefficients1 
  Regression Coefficients (β) 
  North Africa Levant 
Functional Governments: 
1.  Perceptions of Government Efficacy 
2.  Stability 
Dysfunctional Governments: 











Education and Gender: 
1.  Level of education 














5 & 3410 
   
8.79*** 
0.38*** 
5 & 2955 
1 Index of Trust in Government: ReversedQ2011 + RevesexQ2012 + ReversedQ2013 + ReversedQ2016;  
  range 4-16; 
  Index of Perceptions of Government Efficacy: ReversedQ2041 + ReversedQ2042 + ReversedQ20421 +      
  ReversedQ2043 + ReversedQ2043; range 5-20; 
  Index of Stability: ReversedQ101 + ReversedQ101A + ReversedQ102B +Reversed Q105 + Q1072 + Q1074;  
  range 6-25; 
  Index of Corruption: ReversedQ210 + ReversedQ211 + ReversedQ213; range 4-12; 
  Level of Education: (1) Illiterate/No formal education - (7) MA and above; 







In this concluding section, the theoretical and political implications of the empirical 
findings were reviewed. Some suggestions for future research to advance scholarly 
understanding of the contested relationships between Middle Eastern citizens and their 
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Empirical and Theoretical Implications 
  
The quantitative findings indicated that a trust surplus in governmental institutions in the 
Middle East was a result of positive perceptions of government efficacy, and stability. On 
the other hand, corruption eroded citizen trust. However, while both the North African 
and Levantine regions were able to garner an overall trust surplus, said surplus was 
significantly smaller in North Africa than in the Levantine region. Educated Middle East 
citizens were less trusting of their governments in both regions. 
 
Some specifics of the trust dynamics between citizens and their leaders were found in 
the narrative commentaries of professionals and journalistic accounts. For example, The 
Professor (Interviewee #2) offered this scenario. Sectarian leaders are supported by 
foreign leaders and are historically from wealthy families. Therefore, in return for loyalty 
from their voters, they are able to provide tangible services, such as government jobs, 
education to voter’s children in specific prestigious schools. The strong influence of 
leaders on the citizens make it difficult to mobilize against leaders, because voters are 
very dependent on these leaders. According to the Executive Director (Interviewee #1), 
the dependent voter-politician relationship is harmful. Citizens prefer working in the 
government public sector than in the private sector, because staying within the system 
grantees them benefits they would not achieve otherwise. The reinter system, coupled 
with corruption, allows for the elite class in the Middle East to continue controlling 
resources and solidify their power. According to the Executive Director, the economic 
differential between ordinary citizens and elites is vast; the government officials and 
leaders are always of the upper class while citizens are of the lower or middle class, with 
fewer material possessions and wealth.  
  
In the Professor’s experience, there is no motivation for governmental institutions to help 
and support citizens who do not have the ability to change the level of power of leaders, 
because of both the lack of accountability and dependency of Middle Eastern citizens on 
their leaders. Neither are the government agents motivated to facilitate economic 
growth. Lack of accountability also contributes to the little confidence in leaders and 
government agents, and ultimately leads to government inefficacy. Additionally, 
widespread corruption, that goes hand in hand with lack of accountability, is quite 
evident in the Middle East.  
 
Citizens feel that the government is inefficient because they are corrupt. Yet, many do 
not feel they can make a difference, although this sense of powerlessness is not 
widespread throughout the region. As per the Global Corruption Barometer 2016 (Pring 
2016) citizens in Tunisia felt empowered to help fight corruption, and believed ordinary 
people are able to incite change (71%). Citizens in Jordan and Palestine, also had 
positive outlooks on the ability for citizens to make a difference (66%). On the other 
hand, half of the citizens in Morocco, Algeria, Lebanon and Egypt felt disempowered to 
fight corruption. If left unaddressed, as the empirical findings presented in this paper has 










From a theoretical standpoint, there was support in the linear regression findings (Figure 
1) for predictions that were grounded in Max Weber and Gaetano Mosca’s Elite and 
Legitimacy theories. As expected in first hypothesis, functional governments garnered 
more citizen’s trust in the Levant than in North Africa, net of level of education and 
gender. The economic equalities combined with the political turmoil that has roiled the 
North African region, and the unmet expectations of economic and social change offer 
an explanation. The legitimacy of governments (measured by trust surplus garnered by 
government efficacy and stability versus trust deficits derived from corruption was also 
higher in the Levant (Hypothesis #2) as a result of Levantine elites maintaining political 
stability, even if not economic progress. 
 
Figure 1: Empirical (Beta (β) Coefficients1) and Theoretical Models of the Impacts of Perceptions 
of Government Efficacy, Stability and corruption on Trust in Government Institutions in North 
Africa and the Levant2      
    
    2 Data source: Arab Barometer: Public Opinion Survey Conducted in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon,  
     Morocco, Palestine, and Tunisia, 2016; *** p <=.001. 
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Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 
  
Despite the valuable insights presented in this research there is much left to be 
uncovered about citizen trust in government institutions in the Middle East. The fact that 
the adjusted R2 in North Africa was only 0.24*** and the Levantine R2 was 0.38*** 
indicated that there is more to the citizen-government dynamics than citizen perceptions 
of government efficacy, stability, and corruption.  
  
Further research on civil participation in politics of the region will be valuable. In the 
Executive Director’s (Interviewee #2) perspective, citizens expect solutions to social 
problems to come from the government, as opposed to a collaboration between citizens, 
NGO’s and the government. The prevailing ethos in the Middle East is that because the 
leader or government agency was elected, the responsibility lies completely with them, 
without acknowledging the citizens’ role in the challenges they face. For example, 
150,000 children of Syrian refugees have entered Lebanon in the recent years, exerting 
extra pressure on the public schools. A proactive citizenry and support for these schools 
could enhance the efficiency of existing governmental institutions. A bottom up 
approach, through civil empowerment to participate and change the politics in favor of 
citizens, will create a ripple effect, said the Professor (Interview #1).  
  
The ethnocentric and secretariat conflicts that persist in the Middle East is another issue 
that deserves more scholarly attention. According to the Professor, religion is 
manipulated and used by government officials to maintain their position of power. 
Besides, specific ethnic and religious minorities are discriminated against and are kept 
out of political power or autonomy. Ethno-sectarian conflicts are more visible in the 
Levantine region, especially in Iran, Syria, Turkey, and Lebanon. Based on the turmoil of 
the last decade, and the growing insurgency and terrorist groups, such as ISIS, their 






Appendix A. Demographic Controls: Gender and Level Of Education   
Arab Barometer: Public Opinion Survey Conducted in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, 
Palestine, and Tunisia, 20161 
 Concepts Indicators  Responses Statistics 
   North Africa Levant 
Gender Male or Female (0)   Male 

















 1 Level of Education: (1) Illiterate/No formal education - (7) MA and above. 
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Appendix B: Table 2. Correlation (r)   
Arab Barometer: Public Opinion Survey Conducted in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, 
Palestine, and Tunisia, 2016 1,2 



























































































1 Correlation below the diagonal of 1 is North Africa, while the correlation above is the Levant  
2 Index of Trust in Government: ReversedQ2011 + RevesexQ2012 + ReversedQ2013 + ReversedQ2016; range     
  4-16; 
  Index of Perceptions of Government Efficacy: ReversedQ2041 + ReversedQ2042 + ReversedQ20421 +      
  ReversedQ2043 + ReversedQ2043; range 5-20; 
  Index of Stability: ReversedQ101 + ReversedQ101A + ReversedQ102B +Reversed Q105 + Q1072 + Q1074;  
  range 6-25; 
  Index of Corruption: ReversedQ210 + ReversedQ211 + ReversedQ213; range 4-12 
  Level of Education: (1) Illiterate/No formal education - (7) MA and above 
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